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ABSTRACT
Recent studies on human decision—making under uncertainty have
revealed the following typical behavioral principles: (1) the importance
of the status quo as a reference point ("target") for assessing outcomes,
(2) the prevalence of risk—aversion for gains, i.e. above-target payoffs,
but risk—seeking for potential losses, and (3) a tendency to give more
weight or "marginal utility" to a small loss than a gain of the same size.
We investigate whether and how these aspects carry over from the
money to the health context, examining the responses to a questionnaire
by 325 patients from three outpatient facilities in Palo Alto, California.
The questionnaire consisted of twelve hypothetical choice situations
each with the choice between two alternative modes of treatment for a
supposed illness. In each case, one of the options promised a certain
(favorable or unfavorable) health effect, the other one a probabilistic
effect.
The majority choices confirm the relevance for the health context
of all three above—mentioned priciples. Risk—aversion for gains, risk—
seeking for losses and the differences in slope of the utility function
were all significant and substantial in magnitude. Wlien trying to trace
back differences in risk attitudes to demographic or socioeconomic
characteristics of the respondents, we find that education is the most
important correlate choices of people with more years of schooling
exhibit less risk—aversion for gains and less risk—seeking for losses
and thus correspond to a more linear relationship between health and
utility.
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1. Introduction
In the past few years psychologists and economists have conducted
numerous experiments on human decision-making under uncertainty (for
overviews see Kahnemann &Tversky,1979, Shoemaker, 1980) .Aprimary
goal of many of these studies was to test the empirical validity of the
expected utility maximization hypothesis. Further, since the outcomes of
the choices are typically stated as payoffs in money (or, at least, a
marketable commodity), the results can be used to construct "utility-of—
money" functions for the respondents.
These studies frequently report the existence of a reference point
(often the status quo or some "target return") against which a decision-
maker measures the payoffs. Decision behavior was found to differ
substantially between the two regions of payoffs separated by this
benchmark. Kahnemann & Tversky (1979), e.g., observed that a majority
of subjects proved to be risk-averse (concave utility) for above-target
outcomes, but risk-prone (convex utility) for below—target outcomes.
Moreover marginal utility appeared to be considerably larger below the
reference point than above (see Figure 1).2
Figure 1: A typical empirical utility—of--money curve
money
A natural extension of this research is to determine whether the
same principles govern choice behavior when the consequences ("payoffs")
are not monetary but involve a different dimension, e.g., the decision-
maker's health. This is an interesting question for two reasons.
First, if the results of studies of money choices were replicated in
health, this would suggest the possthility of a general law of decision—
making under uncertainty and thereby broaden the psychological foundation
of decision theory. Second, and more practically, evidenceon typical
utility—of-health relationships could provide physicians with information
on how therapeutic effects and side—effects are valued by patients in
Utility3
general and could, therefore, help them to make better choices on behalf
of their patients)'
In an important pioneer work on this subject, Eraker &Sox(1981) asked
respondents to make hypothetical choices between alternative drug therapies
where the health changes associated with the therapies were formulated
in terms of discomfort (hours of heidachc or nausea), physical disability
(distance walked before developing chest pain), or life expectancy.
The general procedure was to let respondents choose between one mode of
treatment with a certain effect and one with the same expected value but
considerable uncertainty. Preferences revealed by the answers to their
questions confirm two of the main findings of the studies on money choices,
namely a tendency toward risk—aversion with respect to favorable outcomes
and risk—seeking with respect to unfavorable outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to raise and attempt to answer several
questions regarding risk attitudes with respect to health that were not
addressed in the Eraker—Sox study:
1) Is the slope of the utility—of—health function different for losses
than for gains? In Eraker—Sox each choice involved only positive
therapeutic effects (gains) or only side effects (losses). We add
choices that cross the reference point by introducing options that contain
both a chance of improvement and a chance of deterioration in health.
2) How strong is the aversion to risk for gains and the preference
for risk for losses? In Eraker-Sox each choice involved two alternative
options that were identical with respect to the expected magnitudes of4
the consequences of the therapy. There was no possibility, therefore,
to learn anything about the strength of these risk attitudes. It would
be interesting to know if the preference for certain over uncertain
prospects (in gains) persists even when the latter has a larger mean.
We therefore include choice situations where the expected values differ,
as well as situations where they are equal.
3) Are differences in individual attitudes toward risk correlated
with socioeconomic characteristics? Previous studies have revealed
large differences across individuals but have not suggested reasons for
these differences. As a modest first step toward explaining how risk
attitudes develop, we gathered data on the socioeconomic characteristics
of the respondents and related these characteristics to their risk
attitudes.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way.
Section 2 recapitulates the theories to be tested. Section 3 describes
the design of the questionnaire and the collection of data. Section 4
discusses the main findings of the data analysis and Section 5 presents
conclusions and proposals for further research.
2. Theories of Decision—Making under Uncertainty
Among the more recently proposed theories of risky choice behavior
are Kahneman &Tversky's(1979) "prospect theory" and Fishburn's (1977)
"mean—risk dominance criterion." Both are briefly restated here.
According to prospect theory, the evaluation of an uncertain
prospect ("lottery") A by an individual can be broken into two components,5
a "value function" v and a "weighting function" f. Suppose that A
consists of n possible payoffs x. (i=1,.. .,n)with associated
probabilities p.,. Then the overall value of the lottery A according to
prospect theory is
(2.1) V(A) =V(x1,p1;...;x,p)f(P).v(x)
As is clear from (2.1), the domain of the value function v consists of
payoffs from the lottery, i.e. changes in wealth (or health, respectively)
rather than achieved levels of it as proposed by expected utility theory.
This stresses the importance of the initial wealth position or status
quo as a reference point. As to the curvature of the value function,
Kahneman & Tversky suggest that v is concave for gains (x>O) and convex
for losses (x<O). The psychological basis for this phenomenon is the
relative overvaluation of small gains and losses owing to their greater
familiarity and the inability to fully imagine large departures from the
status quo. In the neighborhood of x=O, v is claimed to be not
differentiable, but steeper for small losses than for small gains.
The probability weighting function f is normalized by setting
f(O) =0and f(1) =1.If, moreover, f were equal to the identity
function, then prospect theory would formally collapse to expected
utility (or value) maximization. Kahneman & Tversky, however, theorize
that due to an imperfect ability to discriminate among low probabilities,
very low values of p, as soon as they are recognized as different from
zero, are overweighted (f(p)>p), whereas all probabilities in the middle
range are underweighted (f(p)<p) relative to the case of certainty.6
The mean—risk dominance model generalizes the reference point
concept by allowing the benchmark, denoted by t, to differ from the
status quo. A prospect A is judged by its mean payoff and its "riskiness"





(2.3) T =(ii1<i<nand x.<t} = 1
anda>O a parameter. For this measure only below-target outcomes count.
Prospect A dominates another prospect B is it has larger mean and smaller
riskiness (with equality allowed in one of the two criteria) .Whilethis
constitutes only a partial ordering, an obvious supplementation consists
of maximizing a weighted difference between mean and riskiness with the
weights 1 and b (b>O) ,respectively.As Fishburn (1977) showed, this





x—b(t—x) if x < t.
This function is clearly linear for above-target outcomes and steeper to
the left of t than to the right. Its curvature for below-target outcomes
depends upon the value of the parameter a: for a>1 it is concave, for
a=1 linear, and for ct<1 convex.7
3. Questionnaire Design and Data Collection
We designed a questionnaire comprising six different medical
scenarios, each with at most four similar choice situations. In each
case the consequences of two alternative treatments of a hypothetical
condition were described, one of them involving a certain outcome and
the other an uncertain one. Both the magnitudes of the effects and the
probabilities associated with the uncertain option were stated explicitly
in numerical terms. Subjects were asked to indicate how they would
prefer to be treated in each situation.
In translating stylized choice situations into plausible health-
related scenarios several difficulties were encountered. Unlike money,
health is multi-dimensional, but in order to observe pure risk attitudes
all outcomes belonging to one particular choice situation had to be
stated in terms of one dimension. This created a plausibility problem,
especially in cases that contain both gains and losses. We had to
describe medical circumstances in which the same therapy has the
potential to alleviate as well as to aggravate an existing health problem.
Furthermore, there is no generally accepted cardinal scale for
measuring the severity of pain or disability, so we decided to keep
severity constant and vary duration of the effects. Unlike Eraker &Sox
we did not use a life expectancy framework because this allows differences
in time preference to influence the choice and, therefore, makes questionable
the interpretation of the answers within the risk attitude models described
above. Also we did not distinguish scenarios into the categories of
discomfort and disability, but described situations in which both types8
of effects are present (e.g. headaches and the inability to work, read,
or concentrate). By mentioning pain as well as physical limitation we
tried to make the medical problem sound important as well as under-
standable to the respondents.
In this paper we will report on only three of the six scenarios,
which are reprinted in the Appendix. The other three scenarios are
left out because they contained choice situations which were mathematically
more complicated and probably less plausible making those results less
dependable.
In June/July 1981 the questionnaires were given to adult patients
in the waiting rooms of three outpatient facilities in the Palo Alto
(California) area, namely the Veterans Administration Medical Center,
the Stanford General Medical Clinic and the Mid-Peninsula Health Service.
Of the 325 completed questionnaires returned, roughly equal numbers came
from each of the three sources.
Table 1 contains summary statistics of various demographic and
socio—economic characteristics of the sample population.
As can be been from Table 1, women and men are roughly equal in
proportion. All adult age groups, education levels, and income classes
were well represented. The three last—mentioned attributes were
originally observed in categorical form (6—8 classes) and then translated
into the continuous variables shown in Table 1. Note that 37% and 42%,
respectively, had recently experienced the medical conditions in which
the scenarios were framed. Although the sample was drawn from the
waiting rooms of medical clinics, more than 66% of the respondents
assessed their health status as good or excellent; they were not a
particularly sick population.9
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Sample (N=325)
VariableDescription Mean Standard
Deviation
CAGE Age, continuous in years 47.08 16.49
CEDUC Schooling, continuous in years 14.38 2.72
ADJFINC Income adjusted for family size 12.49 7.86
in 1000 Dollars
DFEMAL =1 if female .474
DMAR =1 if married .572
DCHILD =1 if child under 18 in household .318
DSMOKE =1 if currently smokes .226
DEXGHLTH=1 if excellent or good health .662
DHEAD =1 if recently experienced headaches .374
DBACK =1 if recently experienced back pain .424
DLEAVE =1 if eligible for paid sick—leave .326
DVA =1 if at Veterans Administration .311
DMHS =1 if at Mid-Peninsula Health Service .329
a! The omitted class is the Stanford General Medical Clinic.
4. Results
4.1 Testing Hypotheses on Risky Choice Behavior
Table 2 summarizes the results of the choices for each of the
twelve choice situations. The numbers in the third column represent the
percentages of all respondents who chose the certain option. In the
fifth column only those respondents were counted who gave consistent
answers within any given scenario. An answer was classified as inconsistent
whenever a dominated alternative was picked (option B in 1,1 or A in 11,1)
or the respondent switched preferences between certainty and uncertainty
in the wrong direction. An example for the latter case is choosing B10
in 1,2 and switching to A in 1,3 although alternative B isnow more
attractive than before whereas A stayed the same. As can beseen from
the table, the percentage of respondents who made at leastone mistake
lies around 10 percent in scenario I, 14 percent in scenarioII, and
2 percent in scenario III.So on the whole the questions seem to have
been well understood. Our subsequent analysis was confinedto the
set of consistent answers.
Table 2: Percentage Choosing Certainty
Scenario Situationall answersonly consistent answers
N %A N
I 1 94.1307 100 278
2 60.5299 65.3 274
3 42.9 301 43.8 274
4 34.9307 35.2 273
II 1 11.0317 0 272
2 38.6308 33.2 265
3 62.7306 60.7 267
4 65.9305 64.0 267
III 1 76.3304 76.9 299
2 70.6299 70.6 293
3 52.5299 53.6 293
4 39.1299 39.0 292
Those choice situations in which the certain and the uncertaineffects
had equal expected size (1,2; 11,2; 111,1) can be used totest hypotheses
derived from the theories presented in Section 2. Table 3sunmarizes
the predictions made by these theories andcompares them with the majority11
choice observed in our sample.
The null hypothesis in each case is that the sample was drawn from
a population where everybody was indifferent between the respective
options and had to toss a coin to reach a decision. This would amount
to taking N draws from a binorninal distribution with the parameter it=.5.
The observed frequencies, however, lead to a rejection of the null
hypothesis in all three cases at the 99% confidence level.
In scenario I, situation 2, a significant majority prefers a certain
relief from headaches to an uncertain one with equal mean duration,
thereby exhibiting risk—aversion with respect to gains. Prospect theory
would predict such a behavior both because of the concavity of the value
function for gains and because of the underweighting of the probability
1/2 associated with the uncertain relief. In contrast, the mean—risk
dominance criterion is not consistent with this choice since it implies
risk-neutrality on the gain side.
Prospect theory is also supported by the results of scenario II,
situation 2, where the majority prefers an uncertain to a certain side—
effect in terms of headaches, i.e. risk—seeking with respect to losses
in health. The convexity of the value function for losses and, again,
the underweighting of the probability 1/2 contribute to this prediction.
The mean-risk dominance model is immune to refutation in this case since
by leaving the parameter a unspecified it is consistent with all three
kinds of risk attitude on the loss side. Our results suggest that in
the health context a has a value less than one.
Both results replicate findings by Eraker & Sox from similar
scenarios in their study.12
Tabel 3: Tests of Risk Attitude Theories
Scenario, Description of, Choice predicted by: Majority
situation alternatives — ProspectMean-Risk
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expected magnitudes of the effects are identical in each case.
Finally in Scenario III, situation 1, the uncertain option Bcan be regarded
as an even bet on a gain and a loss of equal magnitude. Both Prospect
Theory and the Mean-Risk Dominance model propose that the marginal dis-
utility of losses is larger in absolute value than the marginal utility
of gains and, therefore, predict the rejection of the gamble in favor of
the status quo. A clear majority of the sample confirms this prediction.
Put together, the utility-of-health function appears to have the same
shape as the utility-of-money function that was constructed using the
results of earlier studies and depicted in Figure 1.
4.2 The Intensity of Risk Attitutes
While the discussion of the results so far is concerned with
qualitative aspects of the utility-of-health function we now draw some
conclusions on the quantitative degree of the concavity on the gain side13
and the convexity on the loss side. For example, is the riskaversion
with respect to gains strong enough to make a certaingain preferable even
to an uncertain one that is twice as large inexpected magnitude?
To answer this question and similar ones for the other twoscenarios
we varied the magnitude of the uncertain effect (or itsprobability,
respectively) across the choice situations in each scenario, holding the
certain option constant. By looking at thepercentage distributions of
answers in successive situations (see Table 2) we tried to infer what
difference in expected value would exactlycompensate for the greater
variance involved in the uncertain option, thus bringing abouta 50:50
division of respondents between the two alternative choices.
In Scenario I, 65.3% of all subjects preferred the certaingain to
an uncertain gain of equal expected magnitude (situation 2),butwith the
uncertain magnitude 25% larger, the proportion preferringcertainty went
down to 43.8% (situation 3). Assuming a constant rate ofswitchover from
the certain to the uncertain gain as the latterappreciated in size, an
even split of answers would be obtained at a "risk premium" of about 18%
of the magnitude of the certain gain.
Whether this figure is perceived as "high" or "low" andaccordingly
the utility function as "strongly curved" or "fairly linear"largely
depends, of course, on what one anticipated this figure to be.Two remarks
seem worth adding, though. First, the extent of risk—aversion inthe
domain of gains does not appear to be trivial sincean 18% difference in
expected size is definitely more than a marginal distinction.Respondents
obviously did not place overwhelming importance on the mean effect but14
were willing to trade off mean against a smaller variance. On the other
hand, their choices exhibit a pronounced departure from maximin behavior
which would have implied picking the certain option regardless of the
mean of option B.
Similarly, in Scenario II the share of respondents who chose the
uncertain loss rather than the certain one dropped from 66.8 to 39.3%
as the former was increased in size by one—fourth. Again assuming a
constant rate of switchover from the uncertain to the certain option,
a 15% increase in expected magnitude of the uncertain loss would just
make the median respondent indifferent between the two alternatives.
This interpretation is similar to the one given above concerning the
gain side. The degree of risk-seeking with respect to losses is neither
merely marginal nor is it large enough to induce people always to choose
the option with the smallest possible loss (maximax criterion).
In addition to these observations on the degrees of curvature in
the two parts of the utility function for health changes, we attempted to
measure the differences in slope just left and just right of the
reference point. In the four situation of Scenario III the certain option
is always "no change" whereas the uncertain one offers a chance of a
gain and a chance of a loss equal in magnitude, with the odds varying
from 50:50 to 60:40, 70:30 and, finally, 80:20 in favor of the gain.
In the first three cases a majority of subjects declined to take the
gamble; only the 80:20 odds were acceptable to a majority.
Again looking at the percentages choosing certainty in the last two
situations (53.6% and 39%, respectively) and assuming a switchover linear
to the ratio of the odds offered, we infer that the odds required to15
create just an even split of the sample would be 72.5:27.5or about 2.64:1.
The figure 2.64 can then be interpretedas the ratio of slopes of the
utility function below and above the reference point.
It is worth mentioning that this slope differential isconsiderably
smaller than the median value of 4.8 which Fjshburn&Kochenberger(1979)
found when they tried to fit utility functionsto people's choices in
the money context. Moreover, our estimate isprobably biased upward
since in our medical scenarios the uncertainalternative implied undergoing
an operations whereas the certain one did not. To theextent that
respondents attributed some fixed (psychic) costs tohaving an operation
in the first place, e.g. because they did notquite believe our assertion
that the operation was completely safe,even a utility function symmetric
around the reference point would lead themajority to reject the operation
at least in the case of even chances ofalleviating or aggravating the
illness. Whether this effect alone isstrong enough to explain the
preference for the no-change option to its full extent(and, therefore,
to wipe out slope differential) remains an open question.
4.3 Risk Attitude and Socioeconomic Characteristics
We finally examined what personal characteristics ofthe respondents
are associated with certain risk attitudes. This line ofresearch was
not systematically pursued by Eraker &Soxin their similar study.
While they report that in their sample therewere no differences in risk
attitudes by age, sex, or level of education,they did not use multi—
variate techniques to control for influences of othervariables when they
looked at the effects of each variable in turn.16
We tried to fill this gap by estimating the association between
risk attitudes and the set of background variables introduced above
(Table 1) in a multiple regression framework. To this end we transformed
the responses to the various situations in each of the three scenarios
into continuous left—hand variables.
Our procedure is demonstrated with the help of Scenario I. For each
respondent an artificial variable DRAGAIN ("degree of risk-aversion in
gains") was defined as the risk premium in percentage terms that would
just make the respondent indifferent between the certain and the uncertain
gain. The value was taken to be the midpoint of the risk premiums
implicit in those two situations where the respondent switched from the
certain to the uncertain choice, i.e. 12.5 for those who preferred the
certain gain in situation 2 and the uncertain one in situation 3, and
37.5 for those who chose certainty in situation 3 and uncertainty in
situation 4. For those respondents who always picked either in certain
or the uncertain option, the value of DRAGAIN was set arbitrarily by
extrapolating percentages so as to create equal distances between any
two successive points on the index scale, i.e., 62.5 for the former
and -12.5 for the latter group.
Analogously, a variable DRSLOSS ("degree of risk-seeking in losses")
was defined using the responses to Scenario II. Finally we created a
variable SLOPERAT measuring the ratio of slopes of the utility function
left and right of the reference point as inferred from the odds ratio
at which the individual would just accept the operation offered in
Scenario III. Again interpolation and extrapolation were performed with
some degree of arbitrariness.-17
Each of the dependent variables was regressed on the full set of
socioeconomic variables, with the results reported in Table 4. Very
few of the regression coefficients were significantly larger than their
standard errors, partly because of multicollinearity among the RI-IS
variables.The of .14 and .16 for the first two equations is not
too bad for cross—section observations on individuals. The R2 of
.05 for the third equation indicates that only a negligible portion of
the variation in responses to Scenario III is accounted for by
differences in the socioeconomic variables included in our study.
As is true of many studies in the human capital field, formal
education appears to be the most important variable. The regression
coefficient for years of schooling has high statistical significance
(p <.01)in two of the three equations, and it is more than 1.5 times
its standard error in the third. People with more years of schooling
are less risk—averse in gains, less risk—prone towards losses, and have
a smaller kink in their utility function at the reference point. In
all three respects their behavior fits least well into the pattern
proposed by Prospect Theory, but tends towards a linear relationship
between health and utility. One possible explanation for this finding
is that better educated people are more used to performing numerical
calculations and are, therefore, more inclined to use expected payoff
as an important decision parameter.
In addition to education, two other variables, income and marriage
status, exhibit a sign pattern of coefficients that discriminates
consistently between people behaving according to Prospect Theory and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































pronounced in groups of people who have fewyears of schooling, high
income, and are either single or divorced. Unfortunately,we have no
intuitively plausible reason why the two last mentionedvariables should
have this influence. The income effectmay be a statistical artifact
stemming from the strong correlation between income andschooling (r=.40)
A few RHS are associated consistently witha preference either for
or against certainty (i.e. their coefficients havea sign pattern of
+,-,+or—,+,-inthe three equations, respectively). Asmight be expected,
respondents with children in the household displayedmore risk—aversion
and less risk—seeking. This result makes intuitivesense because these
people probably avoid risks in other aspects of life,too. A greater
preference for certainty can also be observed inpersons who have had
recent experience with the conditions in which thescenarios were framed.
Itis worth noting, however, that this effect, likemost others, is
not significant at the 95% confidence level inany of the three regressions.
Significant differences between the twogroups of respondents with and
without those experiences would have thrown doubton the legitimacy of
drawing inferences from these hypothetical choices forpeople's real
world behavior.
The opposite sign pattern indicating greaterwillingness to choose
the uncertain options is found for smokers and forwomen. The first of
these two findings is hardly surprising since thevery act of smoking
signifies that one is prepared to accept a lotteryon one's own health.
In contrast, it is difficult to determinewhy women should be less risk—
averse than men.20
None of the remaining variables shows any consistent pattern of
influence on the three aspects of risk attitude examined in this study.
It is noteworthy that neither self-reported health status (i.e. the
person's initial position in health) nor eligibility for paid sick-leave
seem to have any significant impact on people's willingness to accept
health gambles.
The only other significant coefficient is the one associated with
the source dummy DVA in the equation for risk-seeking on the loss side.
This is somewhat disturbing given the fact that so many other seemingly
important attributes of the respondents, which discriminate between the
Veterans Administration patients and the rest of the sample (only men,
higher age, less schooling, lower income, poorer health, less children),
are controlled for. However, since this is the only one of the six source
coefficients that is significant, we do not think this implies that a
systematic influence is exerted by the environment where the data are
collected. If this were the case, then it would be questionable to
generalize the results and draw conclusions on the risk attitudes of the
population at large from this study.
5. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
In this paper we investigated whether the typical patterns of decision-
making under uncertainty that were observed empirically in many previous
studies carry over from choices among monetary prospects to the health
dimension. Using a questionnaire which presented hypothetical choice
situations with payoffs in terms of outcomes of medical therapy, we
found that the function relating utility to health changes (which is21
implicit in the majority choices) resembles the utility-of—money function
derived from the results of the studies cited above: peopledisplay risk-
aversion with respect to gains and risk—seeking towards losses, andthey
reject "fair" gambles on gains and losses, i.e. marginal utility of
favorable health effects seems to be smaller than marginaldisutility
of unfavorable changes. These results confirm for the health dimension
the prediction made by various theories on risky choice behavior that
the initial position plays an important role as a referencepoint for
evaluating outcomes.
The aversion to risk for gains and preference for risk when confronted
with possible losses are not only statistically significant but also
substantial in magnitude. We estimate that in order for thestudy
population to be indifferent between a certain and an uncertain gain,
the latter would have to be 18% higher in expected value. Fora certain
loss to be considered to be regarded as equal to an uncertainone, the
former would have to be 15% higher in expected value.
The regressions that attempted to explain differences in attitudes
toward risk across individuals revealed that education was the most
important correlate. Ceteris paribus, the higher the level of education
the less the subjects' choices conform to prospect theory and themore
closely they approximate a linear relationship between health and utility.
While this study has added some new dimensions to the analysis of
risk attitudes, the results are tentative and must be treated with caution.
The sample size is relatively small and the number of questions that
could be asked, limited. It would be desirable to attempt toreplicate22
these results, not only in the health domain but in others as well.
There seems to be general support here for prospect theory, but it would
clearly be desirable to learn more about the strength of this departure
from linearity and to identify those characteristics that are related to
individual differences in attitudes toward risk.
Also, the results presented here exclude the practically relevant
case of catastrophic but low—probability events. Accordingly, we cannot
test those aspects of risk attitude theories that are concerned with
behavior towards small probabilities, especially the "overweighting
effect proposed by Kahneman &Tversky.Unlike monetary choices, it is
very difficult to describe plausible medical scenarios where large
("catastrophic") effects and, as alternative options, small certain
effects can be measured along the same dimension because what makes an
illness catastrophic is seldom its duration but much rather its severity,
for which no generally agreed scale exists.23
FOOTNOTES
*Thisresearch was conducted while the first author was visiting
the National Bureau of Economic Research at Stanford, California.
Keith Marton, M.D., and Harold Sox, M.D., provided valuableassistance
in formulating scenarios for medical decision-making and incollecting
the data. Helpful comments by Amos Tversky, Philip Farrell and
participants of two seminars given at the N.B.E.R. and at Technische
Universitât Hannover are gratefully acknowledged. We also thankthe
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for financial assistance.
1. It may not be feasible or practical for physicians toascertain
separate risk attitudes for each patient.
2. The regression results were not sensitive to changes in the
formula used for the extrapolation.24
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Appendix:The Questionnaire Scenarios
I. Imagine that you are subject to headachesthat last 6 hoursevery day if not treated and are so severe thatyou are unable to work, read or concen-
trate while they last. Suppose thereare two drugs available for headaches:
drug A always gives you 2 hours ofrelief from headaches (i.e., the
duration is reduced from 6 to 4hours);
drug B may or may not giveyou relief from headaches.
Neither drughas any unfavorableside effects. Once you beginusing one drug, it is not possible to switchto the other in the future. Checkyour choice in each of the following foursituations:
Situation1) drug A: you will get 2 hours of relieffrom headaches.
drug B: there Is a 50% chance thatyou will get 2 hours
of relief from headaches, anda 50% chance of
no relief.
Situation 2) drug A: you will get 2 hours of relieffrom headaches.
drug B: there is a 50% chance thatyou will get 4 hours
of relief from headaches, anda 50% chance of
no relief.
uation 3) drug A: you will get 2 hours of relieffrom headaches.
drug B: there is a 50% chance thatyou will get 5 hours
of relief from headaches, anda 50% chance of
no relief.
Situation 4) drug A: you will get 2 hours of relieffrom headaches.
drug B: there is a 50% chance thatyou will get 6 hours
of relief from headaches, anda 50% chance of
no relief.26
II.Imagine that you have a serious disease which must be treated with drugs.
Suppose that there are two drugs available which are both equally effective
against this disease, but differ in their possible side effects:
drug A causes headaches that last for 2 hours each day; -
drugB may or may not cause daily headaches.
Once you choose one drug, it is not possible to switch to the other one in
the future. Remember that both are equally effective in treating the
serious disease.
Check your choice for each of the following four situations:
Situation 1)—drugA: you will have 2 hours of headache per day.
—drugB: there is a 50% chance that you will have
2 hours of headache per day, and a 50% chance
of no headache.
Situation 2) drug A: you will have 2 hours of headache per day.
—drugB: there is a 50% chance that you will have
4 hours of headache per day, and a 50% chance
of no headache.
Situation 3)—drugA: you will have 2 hours of headache per day.
—drugB: there is a 50% chance that you will have
5 hours of headache per day, and a 50% chance
of no headache.
Situation 4)—drugA: you will have 2 hours of headache per day.
—drugB: there is a 50% chance that you will have
6 hours of headache per day, and a 50% chance
of no headache.27
III. Suppose that you have had back pain for two years. Despite the best
medical treatuent available, you have pain that lasts for 6 hours
every day and makes you lie down.
Anew surgical operation for back pain is now available. The operation
is safe and requires only local anaesthetic and one day of recovery time.
When the operation is successful, the duration of daily pain is reduced
by 2 hours. When the operation fails, the duration of pain is 2 hours
longer thanbefore the operation. The effects of the operation are permanent.
The success rate for this operation is not yet known. How wouldyou
feel about having the operation if the success rate were as shown below?
Check your answer for each of the following four situations:
Situation 1) no operation: 6 hours of pain per day;
—operation: 50% success (4 hours of pain);
50% failure (8 hours of pain).
Situation 2) no operation:6 hours of pain per day;
—operation: 60% success (4 hours of pain);
40% failure (8 hours of pain).
Situation 3) no operation:6 hours of pain per day;
—operation: 70% success (4 hours of pain);
30% failure (8 hours of pain).
Situation 4) no operation: 6 hours of pain per day;
—operation: 80% success (4 hours of pairs);
20% failure (8 hours of pain).